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This study examines whether and how syndicated loan structure is affected by the merger 
activity of lead banks. While the ownership structure of a syndicate is influenced by a lead bank’s 
syndication relationships with participating lenders, these syndication relationships can radically 
change in response to critical events, such as a merger involving the lead bank. I predict and 
document that after a lead bank’s merger is complete, the renewal of a syndication relationship 
between the past participants and the lead is less likely, and the merged banks hold a greater portion 
of new loans and form more concentrated syndicates. I also find that the influence of lead banks’ 
mergers on the share of loans retained is conditional on participating lenders’ prior lending 
relationship with the borrower, borrower transparency, and lead banks’ reputation. Overall, my 
empirical results suggest that a lead bank’s merger activity influences its syndication relationships 







This study examines whether and how syndicated loan structure is affected by the merger 
activity of lead banks. A syndicated loan unites two or more differentially informed lenders into a 
group (i.e., a syndicate) in which an informed “lead” bank originates the loan and performs due 
diligence and monitoring, and uninformed “participant” lenders fund part of the loan.1 Due to the 
lead bank’s information advantage over participants and the unobservability of the lead bank’s due 
diligence and monitoring efforts, information asymmetry exists between a lead bank and 
participants within a syndicate (e.g., Leland and Pyle 1977; Holstrom and Tirole 1997; Sufi 2007; 
Bushman, Williams, and Wittenberg-Moerman. 2017). Prior research also suggests that the extent 
of the information asymmetry between these two parties can be reduced by lead banks’ syndication 
relationships with participants, which allows the lead banks with stronger syndication relationships 
to retain a smaller stake in loans. However, a lead bank’s syndication relationships with 
participants may radically change in response to critical events such as mergers (e.g., Halinen, 
Havila, and Salmi. 1999; Anderson, Havila, and Salmi. 2001).2  
Bank mergers are an interesting setting in which to examine a potential change in an 
entity’s syndication relationships because the mergers are generally followed by extensive 
organizational change, such as a large employee turnover in lending departments, integration of 
 
1 Lead banks are also called as “lead arrangers” or “leads.” Participant lenders are called “participating lenders,” 
“syndicate participants,” or simply “participants.”  
2 I use the terms “mergers,” “mergers and acquisitions,” and “M&A” interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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two different information systems and credit-approval processes, and the mixing of two different 
cultures (e.g., Buono, Bowditch, and Lewis. 1985; Rhoades 1998; Zollo and Singh 2004; Boissel, 
Bourveau, and Matry. 2015). These changes can impact the strength of a lead bank’s existing 
syndication relationships with its syndicate participants, since the value of information about the 
lead bank that the participants have accumulated through their prior syndication experience 
becomes at least marginally outdated (e.g., Hakansson and Snehota 1995). While the U.S. banking 
system has undergone dramatic consolidation, and the prior research suggests that mergers may 
trigger a change in the syndication relationship, there is little empirical evidence that brings these 
two lines of research together (e.g., Halinen et al. 1999). To address this void, I examine whether 
and how lead bank mergers alter the syndicate participation decision, resulting in a change in the 
syndicate’s ownership structure. 
Lead bank mergers may influence which participating lenders become syndicate members. 
To illustrate, in a syndicated loan, participants who have a previous syndication relationship with 
the lead bank (“relationship” participants) as well as those who do not have a previous syndication 
relationship with the lead bank (“non-relationship” participants) can decide to join the lead bank’s 
syndicate. Relationship participants, relative to non-relationship participants, are more likely to 
have an endowment of information about the lead bank from their past syndication experience and 
possess enhanced channels of communication with the lead. However, this information advantage 
only partially survives when the lead bank experiences a merger. Having less information about a 
merged lead bank can decrease relationship participants’ willingness to participate in a loan 
arranged by the merged lead bank. On the other hand, the lingering information advantage may 
continue to draw relationship participants to the lead bank’s post-merger syndicate, in which case 
there would be no significant change in the structure of syndicate participation. 
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For non-relationship participants, the willingness to participate in the loan can increase due 
to a more level playing field between the relationship and non-relationship participants. As the 
work of Rajan (1992) suggests, a decrease in the level of information advantage possessed by 
informed lenders (i.e., relationship participants) relative to uninformed lenders (i.e., non-
relationship participants) can increase the aggressiveness with which uninformed lenders compete 
with informed lenders.3 If the degree of relative information asymmetry between relationship and 
non-relationship participants about a lead arranger decreases due to the lead bank’s merger 
activity, non-relationship participants are likely to be more willing to participate in a loan 
syndicated by the merged lead bank.  
I examine how the merger changes the lead bank’s exposure to post-merger loans. When 
the structure of syndicate participation changes after a merger, the information asymmetry between 
participants and the lead in a new, post-merger syndicate may be greater. To compensate for the 
change in information asymmetry, the level of the lead bank’s exposure and commitment to a loan 
(i.e., the proportion of a loan retained by the lead bank) inevitably changes (e.g., Leland and Pyle 
1977; Holstrom and Tirole 1997; Sufi 2007; Giannetti and Yafeh 2012; Bushman et al. 2017). 4 
The literature on syndicated lending suggests that lead banks should retain a greater portion of the 
loan and form more concentrated syndicates when the perceived information asymmetry increases. 
On the one hand, the increase in information asymmetry may require the lead to carry a large share 
of the loan. On the other hand, the merger can lead to greater economies of scale, efficiency, and 
sophistication that may actually offset the asymmetry, in which case the syndicate structure might 
 
3  In light of this competition, the syndication process can be viewed as an auction where potential syndicate 
participants submit sealed bids to the lead bank (e.g., Ivashina and Sun 2011). 
4 In practice, risk sharing in syndicated loans occurs on a pro rata basis according to each lender’s share in the loan 
(Wight, Cooke, and Milbank. 2009). Therefore, a higher percentage of the loan kept by the lead arranger and a higher 
level of syndicate concentration capture an increase in the lead lender’s exposure and commitment. 
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not change (e.g., Amel, Barnes, Panetta, and Salleo. 2004; Al-Sharkas, Hassan, and Lawrence. 
2008). Therefore, how the change occurs in a merger setting is an empirical question.  
Using a sample of syndicated loans from 1989 to 2012, I begin my analysis by investigating 
how bank mergers affect syndicate participation decisions by relationship and non-relationship 
participant lenders. I then examine the effect of a lead bank’s merger activity on the percentage of 
a loan retained by the lead bank and the level of loan concentration based on the Herfindhal index 
of loan shares. To identify lead banks that experienced a merger, I construct a binary variable, 
Merger, which takes a value of 1 if the lead bank has been involved in a merger during the year 
preceding its loan’s issuance.  
Controlling for firm-, loan-, and lender-specific characteristics, as well as lender and year 
fixed effects, I find the following main results. First, I find that, on average, non-relationship 
syndicate participants are more likely to join a syndicated loan arranged by a merged lead bank.  
In other words, the renewal of a syndication relationship between the lead and a past participant is 
less likely after the lead bank completes a merger. This result is robust to assuming that acquiring 
banks inherit the syndication relationships that their target banks have. I also find that lead banks 
retain a greater share of loans and form more concentrated syndicates (i.e., syndicates with a higher 
Herfindhal index) when they syndicate loans after their merger completion.  
After presenting my main results, I explore the extent to which the link between lead banks’ 
mergers and the proportion of the loan retained is conditioned by other mechanisms that can reduce 
the information asymmetry between the lead and participants. The first mechanism I consider is 
participating lenders’ prior lending relationships with the borrower. I find that merged lead banks 
retain a smaller stake in loans when a syndicate is composed of more participants with a prior 
lending relationship with the borrower. This result is consistent with the argument that the 
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participants’ prior interactions with the borrower would allow them to accumulate knowledge 
about the borrower and serve as an alternative source of information that reduces information 
asymmetry between them and the lead (e.g., Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux. 2012).  
I consider two additional information-asymmetry-reducing mechanisms: (1) the 
availability of information about the borrowers and (2) the reputation of the lead bank. The degree 
of information asymmetry between a lead bank and participants decreases when participating 
lenders can more easily learn about the borrower and when lead arrangers are more reputable (e.g., 
Dennis and Mullineaux 2000; Sufi 2007; Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller. 2011; Gopalan, Nanda, and 
Yerramilli. 2011). Using multiple measures of the transparency of the borrower’s information 
environment, such as the borrowers’ analyst coverage, credit rating, and size, I find that merged 
lead banks hold a smaller portion of loans and create a less concentrated syndicate when the 
information environment of their borrower is more transparent. I also document that more 
reputable lead banks hold smaller fractions of loans and have a less concentrated syndicate than 
those with a less established reputation. 
This study contributes to two main streams of literature: relationship lending and bank 
mergers. First, it adds to the literature on relationship lending. My results specifically address how 
the syndication relationship between lead banks and syndicate participants affects syndicated loan 
structure by mitigating information asymmetry problems among these parties. My findings are in 
line with a contemporaneous study by Li (2017), who documents that prior interactions between 
participating lenders and lead arrangers are negatively associated with the share of a loan retained 
by the lead arranger. Building on Li’s (2017) evidence, I explore how lead banks’ critical events, 
such as mergers and acquisitions, affect their syndication relationships and the post-merger 
ownership structure of a loan syndicate. The focus on lender characteristics as a driver of the 
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syndicate structure is a novel approach in this literature, which has largely concentrated on how 
borrower characteristics shape syndicated loan arrangements. My study also suggests that 
participant lenders’ past lending relationships with the borrower act as a substitute for the 
syndication relationship between a lead and participants to reduce information asymmetry among 
these parties, an aspect that has been underexplored in the existing research.  
Second, I contribute to the literature on bank mergers. Understanding the consequences of 
the U.S. financial services industry consolidation in and of itself has been an important area of 
research because the waves of banking consolidations in the United States have significantly 
decreased the number of banking organizations, from about 14,500 in the mid-1980s to 5,600 today 
(Kowalik, Davig, Morris, and Regehr. 2015). While prior research provides some evidence on the 
effects of lender mergers on a lender’s customers, it is silent on whether and how changes in 
merged lenders influence their relationship with their lending partners (e.g., syndication 
relationships) and their subsequent loan structure. Using the U.S. syndicated loan market as my 
setting, I extend the prior research by documenting that merged lead banks form relationships with 
unfamiliar syndicate participants and increase their commitment to new loans by retaining a larger 
share of the loans. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses previous 
research motivating my hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes my sample and data. Chapter 4 presents 





Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Syndicated Loans 
Syndicated loans have become the largest source of corporate financing in the United 
States, growing from approximately $150 billion in 1987 to $2.9 trillion in 2017 (Thomson Reuters 
2017). In contrast to traditional loans, which involve a single lender and a borrower, syndicated 
loans involve multiple lenders that constitute a syndicate. To form a syndicate, a “lead” bank (i.e., 
lead arranger) sends out invitations to a large set of potential lenders, who then choose whether to 
join the syndicate and become “participants.” 5  These lenders jointly offer funds to a single 
borrower, which allows the lenders to share risks, satisfy demand for large loans, and generate 
extra fee income (e.g., Altunbas, Gadanecz, and Kara. 2006). As the demand for syndicated loans 
has increased, a large stream of literature has examined elements of this important market, such as 
what factors influence contract terms and the ownership structure of the loan syndicate itself.  
At a fundamental level, the ownership structure of the loan syndicate is determined by 
information asymmetry between contracting parties (e.g., Leland and Pyle 1977; Diamond 1991; 
Aghion and Bolton 1992; Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). Unlike traditional loans where information 
asymmetry exists only between lenders and borrowers, information asymmetry among lenders also 
 
5 Lead arrangers manage the syndication process. They collect information about the borrower, build a relationship 
with the borrower, negotiate the terms of a loan contract, and monitor the borrower after the loan syndication. Unlike 
the lead arranger, participating lenders generally do not have direct communications with their borrowers and tend to 
maintain an arm’s-length relationship with them. 
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appears in syndicated loans for two main reasons. First, there is an adverse selection problem 
because lenders have different degrees of access to borrowers’ information (e.g., Leland and Pyle 
1977). Since lead arrangers gather information about the borrower and thus have more private 
information about their borrowers than participants do, participants face the risk that lead arrangers 
may not perform due diligence in screening and may originate low-quality loans.6 Second, there 
is a moral hazard problem as participant lenders delegate monitoring of the borrower to the lead 
arranger throughout the life of the loan (e.g., Holstrom and Tirole 1997; Sufi 2007). Since the lead 
arranger’s monitoring effort is not observable, there is a risk that the lead arranger may shirk its 
responsibility by not exerting full effort to monitor the borrower, because the lead lender retains 
only a portion of the loan. Theory suggests that to create incentives for monitoring effort, lead 
arrangers should put skin in the game by retaining a larger share of the loan and forming a more 
concentrated syndicate (e.g., Leland and Pyle 1977; Gorton and Pennacchi 1995; Holmstrom and 
Tirole 1997). This type of syndicate structure is important because it allows lead banks to credibly 
commit to loans they originate and offer participants protection against opportunistic behavior on 
the part of the lead banks. This commitment is costly for a lead arranger, as increased exposure to 
a single borrower restricts diversification of the lead arranger’s loan portfolio and lowers the lead 
arranger’s upfront fee income to exposure ratio (e.g., Esty 2001; Ivashina 2009).7  
  Much of the prior literature has explored how problems arising from information 
asymmetry between the lead arranger and participating lenders in a syndicate can be mitigated by 
borrowers’ attributes, such as borrower transparency and a borrower’s prior relationship with the 
lead arranger (e.g., Dennis and Mullineaux 2000; Sufi 2007; Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari. 2008). 
 
6 Lead arrangers may originate low-quality loans for private benefits and/or cross-selling opportunities with the 
borrower (Mora 2015).  
7 An important motivation for lead arrangers to structure and lead syndicated loan transactions is to generate fee 
income. Lead banks seek to have larger syndicates to generate higher fee income with smaller loan shares (Esty 2001).  
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Information about the borrower is fundamental to the information asymmetry between leads and 
participating lenders. What is also important is the information about lead arrangers that may be 
available to participants. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that participants seek 
information from a variety of data sources to ascertain lead arrangers’ screening and monitoring 
abilities, and in doing so maintain internal rankings of lead arrangers that guide their decisions to 
participate in a syndicate (Gopalan et al. 2011).  
A small number of studies have examined how lead arrangers’ attributes, such as size and 
reputation, can help participants infer the lead arrangers’ abilities and thus mitigate information 
asymmetry among lenders (e.g., Gopalan et al. 2011). Another mechanism that can reduce the 
degree of information asymmetry problems is syndication relationships between the lead arranger 
and participants. In a syndicated loan, those who participate can either have a previous syndication 
relationship with the lead arranger (in which case they are “relationship” participants) or have no 
previous syndication relationship with the lead arranger (in which case they are “non-relationship” 
participants). Just as repeated interactions with borrowers allow lenders to obtain private 
information about the borrower and build an information advantage, repeated interactions with 
lead lenders provide participating lenders opportunities to have a more open communication 
channel with the lead arrangers and to obtain information about them, which reduces asymmetric 
information problems among the syndicate members (e.g., Bushman et al. 2017).8   
Consistent with the argument that past syndication experience with a lead bank may serve 
as an information source to participants, the literature suggests that a lead arranger retains a smaller 
share of the loan when its syndicate consists of more relationship participants (e.g., Li 2017). The 
 
8 Anecdotal evidence suggests that lead banks do care about their relationships with other banks. Lead banks refer the 
participating banks as their lending partners and even have entire departments responsible for communicating with 
their lending partners and marketing their deals (Etsy 2001). 
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importance of information that participating lenders have about lead arrangers raises the question 
as to how a critical event for the lead arranger, such as its merger activity, can affect the syndication 
relationship and syndicate structure.  
2.2. Mergers, Syndication Relationships, and Syndicate Structure 
Since mergers have dramatically reduced the number of U.S. banks, a large literature has 
examined the consequences of consolidation in the U.S. financial services industry. Most studies 
in this area focus on the main motivation of bank consolidation – maximization of shareholder 
value through increased market power and efficiency.9 A few studies have investigated the effects 
of bank mergers on a bank’s relationships with external borrowers and the subsequent contract 
terms (e.g., Sapienza 2002; Di Patti and Gobbi 2007). While prior research provides evidence that 
mergers disturb the lender’s relationship with its customers, we do not yet know how lender merger 
activity affects the lender’s relationship with its lending partners and the subsequent loan structure.   
To shed light on this issue, I examine the link among lead bank mergers, syndication 
relationships, and syndicate structure. An advantage of investigating syndication relationships is 
that syndicated loan contracts are disclosed publicly, which allows researchers to observe with 
whom lead banks arrange their syndicated loans (i.e., who the participants are) and how the 
composition of the participants changes.10 Basing on prior research suggesting that an entity’s 
critical events can trigger radical change in its business relationships (e.g., Halinen et al. 1999), I 
argue that when lead banks experience mergers, these events may influence their syndication 
relationships.  
 
9 See Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999), Amel, Barnes, Panetta, and Salleo (2004), and DeYoung, Evanoff, and 
Molyneux (2009) for reviews of these studies. 
10 While prior research posits that an entity’s business relationships change after its merger is complete, this prediction 
has not been examined with a large-sample-based empirical approach because it is challenging to obtain data that 
allow researchers to trace the entity’s business relationships before and after its merger activity.  
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Mergers can involve sweeping changes to a bank’s organization, personnel, and culture 
(e.g., Buono, Bowditch, and Lewis. 1985; Rhoades 1998; Zollo and Singh 2004; Boissel et al. 
2015); as a result, the important information participating lenders have gathered about lead 
arrangers can become unreliable. Some studies also mention that bank mergers affect merged 
financial firms’ use of information to monitor their borrowers as well as the information 
environment of the merged lenders (e.g., Stein 2002; Wu and Zang 2009; Chen and Vashishtha 
2017). As the literature suggests, it thus seems highly likely that mergers can affect a bank’s future 
syndication relationships and syndication structure (e.g., Halinen et al. 1999; Anderson et al. 
2001).  
Basing my prediction on prior research on the competition among differentially informed 
lenders to win a loan deal, I expect that a lead bank’s merger activity can affect the post-merger 
structure of its syndicate membership, which consists of relationship and non-relationship 
participants. For example, Rajan (1992) suggests that a decrease in the level of information 
advantage possessed by informed lenders (i.e., relationship participants) against uninformed 
lenders (i.e., non-relationship participants) increases the aggressiveness with which uninformed 
lenders compete against informed lenders. I apply the intuition from his model to understand how 
information asymmetry issues between relationship and potential non-relationship participants 
may affect their loan-participation decision. When a lead bank goes through a merger, the 
information advantage possessed by its relationship participants relative to its non-relationship 
participants seems very likely to decrease marginally, and this shift may increase non-relationship 
participants’ willingness to participate in syndicated loans arranged by the merged lead bank. 
However, it is possible that the structure of syndicate participation will not change after a lead 
bank’s merger. Even though a lead bank’s merger decreases the value of the relationship 
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participants’ information endowment about the lead bank, relationship participants might continue 
to join syndicated loans arranged by the merged lead bank because they have gained familiarity 
with the merged bank through prior syndication experiences.  
If information that relationship participants possess about their lead banks becomes 
outdated after the merger, and/or more non-relationship participants join a merged lead bank’s 
syndicate, I expect greater information asymmetry between syndicate participants and the lead 
bank. Theory predicts and empirical evidence demonstrates that the severity of the information 
asymmetry between the lead arrangers and participants increases the participants’ demand for lead 
arrangers to hold a greater proportion of the loan (e.g., Leland and Pyle 1977; Gorton and 
Pennacchi 1995; Holmstrom and Tirole 1997; Sufi 2007; Ball et al. 2008; Giannetti and Yafeh 
2012; Bushman et al. 2017). In practice, risk sharing in syndicated loans occurs on a pro-rata basis 
based on each lender’s share of the loan (Wight et al. 2009). Therefore, if a lead arranger keeps a 
higher percentage of the loan, it increases its own exposure and commitment. I hypothesize that 
merged lead arrangers hold a greater share of the loan and form a more concentrated syndicate 
when they syndicate loans after their merger completion. This prediction is not without tension. 
For example, mergers can lead to greater economies of scale, efficiency, and sophistication (e.g., 
Amel et al. 2004). Also, lead banks can help level the playing field for all participants, offsetting 
the increase in information asymmetry. Therefore, whether and how the syndicate structure 
changes in a merger setting is an empirical question. 
2.3. Mechanisms to Mitigate Increase in Information Asymmetry from Bank Mergers 
I also consider whether the link between a lead bank’s merger activity and its exposure to 
post-merger loans (i.e., the percentage of loans retained and loan concentration) is conditioned by 
other mechanisms that potentially reduce information asymmetry among the syndicate members. 
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The first mechanism I consider is participants’ prior lending relationships with the borrower. Even 
though participating lenders do not have privileged access to the borrower, as lead arrangers do, 
these participants should still perform their own assessment of the borrower’s credit quality when 
they make their participation decision (Esty 2001). Participants’ repeated interactions with the 
borrower may allow the participating lenders to accumulate knowledge about it; thus, they may 
have better access to the borrower than participating lenders who do not have a prior relationship 
with the borrower (e.g., Gadanecz et al. 2012). This type of a relationship provides participating 
lenders with an alternative source of information that reduces information asymmetry problems 
between the participants and the lead bank. Therefore, I predict that when a syndicate is composed 
of more participating lenders with a prior relationship with the borrower, merged lead banks hold 
a smaller proportion of loans and less concentrated syndicates. 
I further consider whether the impact of lead bank mergers on the percentage of shares 
retained and loan concentration varies with the borrowers’ information environment as well as 
with the reputation of lead arrangers. I expect that when a borrower is more transparent, 
participating lenders have more sources of information with which to learn about and monitor the 
borrower (e.g., Sufi 2007; Guntay and Hackbarth 2010; Mansi et al. 2011). Conversely, when a 
borrower is more opaque, participating lenders have fewer sources of information about the 
borrower and will need to rely more on their lead bank. Therefore, in a testable hypothesis, I predict 
that the link between bank mergers and merged lead lenders’ share of the loan and loan 
concentration is less pronounced when the borrower is more transparent, and more pronounced 
when the borrower is more opaque.  
I expect a similar substitute effect regarding lead arrangers’ reputations. Prior studies argue 
that a lead arranger’s reputation can be an effective mechanism in reducing ex ante and ex post 
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moral hazard (e.g., Pichler and Wilhelm 2001; Gopalan et al. 2011). Therefore, lead arrangers who 
have experienced bank mergers may retain a smaller fraction of the loan at the margin if they have 
more established reputations in the syndicated loan marketplace. 
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Sample, Data, and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1. Data Sources and Sample Selection 
I start with data on DealScan from 1989 to 2012. I restrict my sample to this time period 
because the level of coverage on loan data is limited on DealScan before 1989 and because a large 
increase in the number of bank mergers occurred around this period. To identify lead arrangers, I 
use the lender arranger credit information available in DealScan. If the lender arranger credit is 
missing, I follow the prior literature and identify the lead arranger as the lender whose role has 
been specified as Admin Agent, Agent, Arranger or Lead Bank in the database (e.g., Chen and 
Vashishtha 2017). I use Chava and Roberts’ (2008) DealScan-Compustat linking table to match 
the borrower identifiers in DealScan to the borrower identifiers in Compustat. I limit my sample 
to loans issued to borrowers and banks based in the United States, as I am interested in the effect 
of bank mergers on the syndicate structure in that country.  
Merger information comes from the SNL Financial Bank Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database (SNL database). The SNL database provides comprehensive information on the mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) activities of banking institutions in the United States. While the database 
provides banking institutions’ CUSIP and RSSD IDs, these identifiers are not provided by 
DealScan. Therefore, I link lender identifiers in DealScan to their bank holding company’s RSSD 
ID as well as to their Compustat identifiers (i.e., GVKEY). I first match lenders’ IDs from 
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DealScan to lenders’ IDs from Compustat.11 I link these lenders’ identifiers to the RSSD ID of 
their bank holding company (BHC) using the Federal Reserve’s CRSP-RSSD linking table. I then 
match the lead banks identified from loan contracts in DealScan to the SNL database using the 
BHC’s RSSD ID and CUSIP. 12 Using the merger data, I flag facilities that involve a lead arranger 
who experiences a bank merger within twelve months prior to the loan issuance date. To indicate 
a lead arranger with the merger experience, I treat only the mergers and acquisitions that are 
classified as “non-government assisted” and that do not involve two banks owned by the same 
bank holding company. Using the merger information, I trace lending relationships through time 
even if the original relationship lender disappears due to M&As. I obtain borrower and lender 
characteristics from Compustat and Bank Compustat, respectively. 
Table 1 presents the sample selection process for the period from 1989 to 2012. I first start 
with facilities issued to U.S. public firms in U.S. dollars by lead banks based in the United States. 
Following prior research, I exclude all financial services firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 
6999). Next, I exclude facilities with insufficient loan, borrower, and lender data. I estimate 
borrower and lender characteristics in the quarter prior to the loan issuance. This process leaves a 
final sample of 9,752 facilities related to 1,941 firms. 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in my tests. All variables 
are described in detail in the appendix. To reflect the previous syndication relationship of the lead 
arranger and syndicate participants, I create a variable, Participant-Lead No-Relationship, which 
 
11 I also use Schwert’s (2018) lender link table that matches all lenders with at least 50 loans or at least $10 billion in 
loans volume in the DealScan-Compustat sample as a supplement and cross check. 
12 In addition to using the SNL data, I use the merger data of Mora (2015) as a supplement and cross check.  I thank 
Nada More for kindly sharing this information. 
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is a binary variable equal to 1 if the participant was not involved in a deal with the lead arranger 
over the one year preceding the loan issuance date. This variable effectively represents a “non-
relationship” participant. Following Sufi (2007), I use a one-year window.13 The mean value of 
Participant-Lead No-Relationship indicates that 21.4% of syndicate participants do not have a 
previous syndication relationship with the lead arranger. This value is in the ballpark with prior 
studies (e.g., Bushman et al. 2017) that consider this relationship variable. I use an indicator 
variable, Merger, which equals 1 if the lead arranger issues a loan within the one-year period after 
the effective date of the merger. The mean value of Merger indicates that 27.5% of facilities were 
syndicated by lenders who were part of mergers during the past twelve months. 
For my analyses on the relationship between bank mergers and syndicate structure, I follow 
prior research and focus on the proportion of a loan retained by the lead arranger (Lead Allocation). 
For loans with sufficient data, the mean value of Lead Allocation is 21.1%; the median is 15%. As 
an alternative dependent variable, I also use the level of concentration of holdings within a 
syndicate based on the Herfindhal index of loan shares (Syndicate Concentration) (e.g., Sufi 2007; 
Lin et al. 2012). Syndicate Concentration is calculated as the sum of the squared individual 
percentage shares in the loan, and it varies from 0 to 10,000 (100 × 100), with 10,000 being the 
Herfindhal when a lender holds 100% of the loan. The lower value of the Herfindhal index 
indicates that a syndicate is more dispersed, and the borrower is monitored less closely. The mean 
and median value of Syndicate Concentration are 1,686 and 1,139, respectively, and the 
distribution is similar to that of prior studies (e.g., Sufi 2007).   
With respect to loan characteristics, the average loan size is $218 million. In terms of 
Maturity (defined as the logarithm of maturity), the average is 43 months. A total of 67.1% of the 
 
13 On average, 94% of syndicate participants in my sample rejoin a syndicate issued by a lead arranger with whom 
they worked within the past year. I also perform my tests using a 3-year window for a robustness check.   
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sample loans have performance pricing provisions (PP), 61.0% are secured (Collateral), and loans 
have on average 1.7 financial covenants (Covenants). Most of the loans are revolvers (63.3%), and 
8.4% are term loans B and below, which are typically made by nonbank institutional investors. 
Moreover, 62.4% of sample loans are issued to borrowers with an investment-grade rating. With 
respect to loan pricing, the average interest rate spread is 137.55 basis points (where Spread is the 
logarithm of the all-in-drawn spread). Moreover, Borrower-Lead Relationship indicates that 
50.5% of loans are issued by lead arrangers who have a prior relationship with the borrower. 
Following the prior literature, I consider loans to be relationship loans if the lead arranger 
syndicated a loan to the same borrower within the five years preceding the date of a loan’s issuance.   
With respect to borrower characteristics, the average and median ratio of earnings before 
extraordinary items to total assets (ROA) is 0.9% and 1.1%, respectively, similar to the ROA of 
borrowers in the samples used in prior research. Sample firms have an average and median interest 
coverage ratio (Interest coverage) of 14.03 and 3.927, respectively. The mean of Leverage (total 
liabilities over total assets) is equal to 62.9%. Sample firms have a mean value of total assets of 




Research Design and Findings 
 
In this chapter, I present my empirical findings in the following subsections. Section 4.1 
presents my main analyses. Specifically, section 4.1.1 investigates whether and how bank mergers 
affect the syndicate relationships between lead arrangers and participating lenders. Section 4.1.2 
examines post-merger effects on the syndicate structure. Section 4.1.3 considers whether the link 
between bank mergers and the syndicate structure varies by participant lenders’ lending 
relationship with the borrower. Section 4.2 provides additional analyses by considering whether 
the effects of bank mergers on the syndicate structure vary by borrowers’ information environment 
and lead arrangers’ reputation. Section 4.3 provides robustness testing. 
4.1 Main Analyses 
4.1.1. Bank Mergers and Participant-Lead Syndication Relationship 
I first examine how bank mergers affect the syndication relationship between participating and 
lead lenders by exploring syndicate participation decisions by relationship and non-relationship 
participant lenders. To examine the link between bank mergers and the syndicate participation 
decision, I employ the following linear probability model at the facility-lead-participant level: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃– 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁–𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 =  𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 (1) 
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where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃– 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁–𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is a binary variable equal to 1 if the syndicate 
participant has not participated in a syndicate arranged by the loan’s lead arranger in the year 
preceding the loan’s issuance and 0 otherwise. To calculate this variable, I let acquiring banks 
inherit their target banks’ prior syndication relationships. Merger is the variable of interest and 
equals 1 if the loan’s lead arranger has been involved in a merger during the year preceding the 
loan’s issuance.  
I control for various factors that prior research suggests are associated with the probability 
of a non-relationship participant joining a syndicate (e.g., Bushman et al. 2017; Kang, Williams, 
and Wittenberg-Moerman. 2018). I include the borrower’s characteristics, such as profitability 
(ROA), interest coverage ratio (Interest Coverage), leverage (Leverage), the natural logarithm of 
size of total assets (Size), and the market-to-book ratio (MTB). I also control for whether the lead 
arranger and the borrower have a prior lending relationship (Borrower-Lead Relationship) and 
whether the borrower is rated as investment grade (Investment Rating). I further include loan 
characteristics, including the natural logarithm of facility amount (Amount), maturity (Maturity), 
whether the loan is a revolving line of credit (Revolver), whether the loan is a term loan B or below 
(Term Loan B), whether the loan is secured (Collateral), the existence of performance pricing 
provisions (PP), the number of covenants (Covenants), and the number of participant lenders (# 
of Lenders). Moreover, I include lender characteristics, such as size (Lender Size), deposit ratio 
(Lender Deposit), loan ratio (Lender Loan), and whether the lender was the lead arranger of a 
syndicate for the first time (First Lead). I include lender and year fixed effects and cluster standard 
errors by package ID to correct for within-package correlation in the error term.14  
 
14 For a robustness check, I cluster standard errors by lead arrangers, and my inferences remain unchanged. 
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I present my results in Table 3. The coefficient on Merger is significant and positive, 
indicating that the probability that a participant with no previous syndication relationship with a 
lead bank joins the syndicate is 12% higher following the lead bank’s merger completion.  
Conversely, this result suggests that the renewal of a past lead-participant relationship is less likely.   
With respect to controls, the significantly positive coefficient on Collateral implies that it 
is more likely for secured loans to be funded by non-relationship participants. When a loan is 
syndicated by the lead arranger for the first time (First Lead), the lead arranger is less likely to 
have past relationships with other lenders. The renewal of a past lead-participant relationship is 
more likely when a lead arranger has a prior relationship with the borrower (Borrower-Lead 
Relationship). This evidence is consistent with the prior literature, which suggests that relationship 
participants are more willing to rejoin a lead arranger’s syndicate when it has superior borrower 
information (e.g., Champagne and Kryzanowski 2007).   
4.1.2. Bank Mergers and Syndicate Structure 
Next, I examine how bank mergers affect the ownership structure of syndicated loans 
arranged by merged lead banks. I estimate the following OLS model at the facility-lead level: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 (2) 
 
where the left-hand-side variables include Lead Allocation, the percentage of a loan retained by 
the lead arranger, and Syndicate Concentration, the sum of the squared individual shares in the 
loan.15 Merger equals 1 if a syndicate is issued by a lead arranger who has been involved in an 
 
15 For these analyses, my sample size is reduced because I require data on the percentage lead arrangers’ ownership 
for Lead Allocation, and data on the percentage of lead arrangers’ and participating lenders’ ownership for the 
Syndicate Concentration.  
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M&A during the one-year period preceding the loan issuance. I predict 𝛽𝛽1 > 0. I include borrower-
, loan-, and lender-specific characteristics as my controls in the regression model. I also include 
lender and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors by package level.  
 Table 4 presents my results. In the first column, consistent with my prediction, I find that 
Lead Allocation increases for lead banks that recently underwent mergers. In terms of economic 
significance, the share of loans retained by lead arrangers increases by 6% (at the mean of 21.1) 
after bank mergers. The magnitude of the effect is similar to the effect of a one standard deviation 
change in a key credit risk measure, ROA (4%), and a one standard deviation change in a 
monitoring mechanism, Covenant (6%).   
With respect to control variables, lead banks that issue syndicated loans to bigger and more 
profitable borrowers retain a smaller proportion of their loans. A first-time lead bank also holds a 
higher loan share, which suggests that participants require new lead banks to put more skin in the 
game. Also, the coefficient on loan size is negative and significant, which is consistent with the 
idea that the size of loans reflects the overall syndicate risk exposure, as Ball et al. (2008) suggest.  
Lead arrangers of large loans retain a smaller ownership percentage because larger deals are 
expected to be financed by a larger number of syndicate members (due to capital requirement 
constraints or to limit risk exposure to one borrower).   
In the second column, I present the results of performing the estimation model using 
Syndicate Concentration as the dependent variable. The coefficient on Merger is marginally 
significant and positive, and the directions of the coefficients of control variables are similar to 
those of the first column. For example, a syndicate is more dispersed when the borrower is large 
and profitable and when loans are large and have longer maturity. 
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In summary, these analyses presented in section 4.1 provide evidence that non-relationship 
participants are more likely to join syndicates arranged by lead banks engaged in merger activities.  
This evidence also suggests that the continuation of past syndication relationships between lead 
arrangers and participating lenders is less likely, consistent with prior research, which suggests 
that merger activities disturb merged entities’ existing relationships with their business partners 
(e.g., Halinen et al. 1999; Anderson et al. 2001). Moreover, lead banks hold a greater portion of 
new loans and form more concentrated syndicates when they syndicate loans after their mergers 
are complete. This evidence is consistent with my prediction that lead banks increase their stakes 
in syndicates to mitigate the increased information asymmetry among syndicate members after the 
lead banks’ mergers.  
4.2. Cross-Sectional Analyses 
I next conduct analyses conditional on several mechanisms that are expected to reduce 
information asymmetry among the syndicate members. These are participants’ prior lending 
relationships with the borrower, borrower transparency, and lender reputation. 
4.2.1 Participants’ Relationship with the Borrower 
I first examine whether the link between bank mergers and the post-merger syndicate 
structure varies by participating lenders’ prior lending relationships with the borrower. I expect 
that the information participants have obtained through their interactions with lead lenders 
becomes less significant when participating lenders have learned about the borrowers through their 
past syndication experience. Therefore, I predict that merged lead arrangers retain a smaller 
fraction of new loans and create less concentrated syndicates at the margin when more participating 
lenders in a syndicate are familiar with the borrower. 
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I define an indicator variable, Participant-Borrower Relationship, to be equal to 1 if the 
ratio of the number of participants who have been involved in a deal with the borrower over the 
five years preceding the loan issue date to the total number of participants in a deal is above the 
sample median and 0 otherwise. I augment equation (2) with Participant-Borrower Relationship 
and the interaction term Merger × Participant-Borrower Relationship. 
I present my results in Table 5. Consistent with my prediction, the coefficient on Merger 
× Participant-Borrower Relationship is significantly negative for both Lead Allocation and 
Syndicate Concentration. When a loan has fewer participant lenders who have prior relationships 
with the borrower, the share of the loan retained by a lead bank increases by 12%, and the level of 
loan concentration increases by 10% after the merger. However, these effects disappear when there 
are more participant banks with prior relationships with the borrower. These results are consistent 
with those of Sufi (2007) and Li (2017), who suggest the importance of participant-borrower 
relationships in reducing information asymmetry problems in syndicates. My analyses also 
indicate the interaction effects of participant-borrower and participant-lead relationships and 
suggest that these two relationship mechanisms substitute for each other. 
4.2.2 Borrower Transparency 
I examine whether the effect of bank mergers on the syndicate structure varies by the level 
of a borrower’s information transparency. I conjecture that when a borrower is more transparent, 
the relation between bank mergers and the syndicate structure will be weaker, as participating 
lenders have more sources of information to learn about and monitor the borrower. Conversely, 
when a borrower is more opaque, this relationship will be stronger, as participating lenders have 
fewer sources of information about the borrower. To conduct my empirical analyses, I use several 
measures of borrower transparency suggested by the literature.  
 25 
First, as prior research suggests that equity analysts are informative to lenders (e.g., Guntay 
and Hackbarth 2010; Mansi et al. 2011), I use analyst coverage to measure the availability of 
information about the borrower. I expect that the link between bank mergers and the syndicate 
structure will be weaker when more equity analysts are following the borrower. To perform my 
analysis, I define Analyst Coverage as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the number of equity 
analysts following the borrower is above the sample median in the year of a loan’s issuance and 0 
otherwise. I augment equation (2) with Analyst Coverage and the interaction term Merger × 
Analyst Coverage. I report the results of my analysis in Table 6. As I report in Panel A of Table 6, 
the coefficient on Merger × Analyst Coverage is negative and significant for both Lead Allocation 
and Syndicate Concentration. Economically, after completing their mergers, lead arrangers hold 
2.96% less of the loan (14% at the mean of 21.1) when the borrower is transparent. The results and 
inferences are similar when I use the Herfindhal index measure of concentration (Syndicate 
Concentration) as my dependent variable.  
Second, I rely on a borrower’s credit rating because it helps lenders assess borrower 
creditworthiness (e.g., Sufi 2007). I predict that the effects of bank mergers on the syndicate 
structure will be weaker when the borrower has a good credit rating.  I assign an indicator variable, 
Rated, equal to 1 if the borrower has an investment-grade credit rating in the year of a loan’s 
issuance and 0 otherwise. I augment equation (2) with Rated and the interaction term, Merger × 
Rated. I report in Panel B of Table 6 that the coefficient on Merger × Rated is negative and 
significant for both Lead Allocation and Syndicate Concentration. Lead arrangers hold 10% less 
(at the mean of 21.1) when the borrower has an investment-grade credit rating. Column (2) presents 
similar results using Syndicate Concentration as the dependent variable.   
My third measure of the transparency of the borrower’s information environment is based on 
a borrower’s size, as smaller firms suffer more from asymmetric information problems (Berger and 
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Udell 1995). I predict that the effects of bank mergers on the syndicate structure will be stronger 
when the borrower is small. I define the Small Borrower indicator variable to be equal to 1 if the 
borrower’s total assets are below the sample median in the year of a loan’s issuance and 0 
otherwise. As I report in Panel C of Table 6, the coefficient on Merger × Small Borrower is positive 
and significant for both Lead Allocation and Syndicate Concentration. After their mergers, when 
lead arrangers issue loans to small borrowers, they hold 2.2% more of the loans (or 10% at the 
mean of 21.4).  
4.2.3 Bank Mergers and Lead Reputation 
I next investigate whether the magnitude of the relation between bank mergers and the 
syndicate structure is conditional on a lead arranger’s reputation in the syndicated loan market. 
Lead arrangers’ reputation may serve as an information source for participant lenders, and lenders 
with a good reputation need to provide relatively fewer incentives to counteract information 
asymmetries (e.g., Ross 2010; Gopalan et al. 2011). Therefore, I conjecture that after their merger 
completion, more reputable lead arrangers hold a smaller fraction of loans and form less 
concentrated syndicates than those with less established reputations.   
I define an indicator variable Large Lead to be equal to 1 if the lead arranger is in the top 
quartile in terms of market share during the year and 0 otherwise. I augment equation (2) with 
Large Lead and the interaction term Merger × Large Lead. The coefficient on Merger × Large 
Lead in Table 7 is negative and marginally significant for Lead Allocation. The coefficient on the 
interaction term is also negative and significant for Syndicate Concentration. Economically, a 
syndicate is 7% more concentrated (at the mean of 1,686) for smaller lead arrangers with merger 
activities. Larger lead arrangers are able to offset this effect, as the coefficient on the interaction 
term suggests. 
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 Collectively, this set of analyses suggests that the link between bank mergers and the 
syndicate structure is less pronounced when more participant lenders in a syndicate have a previous 
relationship with the borrower. This result suggests a substitution effect between the participant-
lead relationship and participant-borrower relationship in reducing the information asymmetry 
problems. Moreover, the effect of bank mergers on the syndicate structure is less pronounced for 
transparent borrowers and more pronounced for opaque borrowers. This evidence is consistent 
with a notion that when participating lenders have more sources of information with which to learn 
about and monitor the borrower, they rely less on information they obtain from their interactions 
with lead arrangers. Finally, the results indicate that the participant-lead relationship becomes less 
important in reducing information asymmetry among syndicate members when more reputable 
lead banks arrange syndicated loans. 
4.3 Additional Analyses 
4.3.1 Robustness Testing: Bank Mergers and Participant-Lead Syndication Relationship 
I perform several robustness checks relating to my analysis in section 4.1.1 (Table 3), in 
which I examine how bank mergers affect lead banks’ syndication relationships with their 
participants.  
 First, I limit my sample to loans arranged by exactly one lead lender. When more than one 
lead arranger is present, it is difficult to determine which lead arranger brought a given participant 
to the syndicate. For example, in the presence of multiple lead arrangers (i.e., Bank A and Bank 
B), it is unclear whether Bank C joined the syndicate because of Bank A or Bank B. Therefore, as 
a robustness check, I exclude all loans with multiple lenders and repeat the analysis. While this 
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significantly reduces my sample size (to 58,240), the inferences from the untabulated results 
remain unchanged.   
 Second, rather than using a one-year window, I use a three-year window to define 
relationship and non-relationship participants. In other words, I define relationship participants 
(non-relationship participants) as those who have (not) participated in a syndicated loan arranged 
by the loan’s lead arranger in the three years preceding the loan’s issuance. I re-perform my 
analysis using this alternative measure, and the untabulated results are quantitatively and 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3.  
Third, given my dichotomous dependent variable, I re-perform my analysis using logistic 
specifications. As my main estimation model, I use OLS specifications instead of logistic 
specifications because Greene (2004) notes that consistency issues can arise when fixed effects are 
used in non-linear models. When I repeat my analysis using a logit model, my inferences from the 
untabulated results remain unchanged. 
4.3.2 Alternative Measure for Syndicate Structure 
While I use the percentage of a loan retained by the lead bank and the Herfindhal index of 
loan shares for my main analyses, for a robustness check, I use the total number of lenders and the 
total number of participating lenders in a syndicate as the dependent variables (e.g., Sufi 2007; 
Lin, Malatesta, and Xuan. 2012). The mean (median) value of the total number of lenders is 13 
(9). The mean (median) value of the total number of participant lenders is 11 (8). I repeat my 
analysis on the relation between bank mergers and syndicate structure using these two measures. 
The untabulated results indicate that the estimated coefficients for Merger are -0.562 and -0.603, 
respectively, and they are statistically significant. In economic terms, the total number of lenders 
and participant lenders joining syndicates decreases by 4% and 6%, respectively, when the 
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syndicates are arranged by lead banks that have recently experienced mergers. Consistent with my 
previous inferences, these results suggest that lead banks form more concentrated syndicates and 





In this study, I examine whether and how syndicated loan structure is affected by the 
merger activity of lead banks. Prior research on business relationships has conjectured that an 
entity’s critical events can trigger a radical change in its business relationships (e.g., Halinen et al. 
1999). This conjecture can be applied to syndication relationships between a lead arranger and 
participating lenders, yet there is little empirical evidence on the matter. Using bank mergers and 
the syndicated loan market in the United States as my setting, I first examine the relation between 
lead bank mergers and the post-merger syndicate membership. I find that participant lenders with 
no prior syndication relationship with merged lead banks are more likely to join their post-merger 
syndicates. This result suggests that the continuation of past syndication relationships between 
merged lead arrangers and participating lenders is less likely, which is consistent with the literature 
suggesting that merged entities’ existing relationships with their business partners are disturbed 
after their merger activity.   
I then investigate how a lead bank’s merger activity influences the level of its exposure and 
commitment to post-merger loans. I expect that there is greater information asymmetry among 
syndicate members after lead banks complete mergers; as a result, the lead banks put more skin in 
the game. I find that merged lead banks retain a higher share of new loans and form more 
concentrated syndicates. Further, I provide evidence that the relation between bank mergers and 
syndicate structure varies by syndicate participants’ prior lending relationships with the borrower, 
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borrower transparency, and the lead arranger’s reputation. The directions of these variations are 
consistent with prior research. Specifically, I find that merged banks retain a smaller fraction of 
new loans and create less concentrated syndicates at the margin when (1) more participating 
lenders in a syndicate are familiar with the borrower, (2) the borrowers are more transparent, and 
(3) the lead banks themselves have more established reputations. While I document these results, 
I am unable to comment on the overall net benefit or cost of bank mergers on the syndicated loan 
market, as the syndicated loan involves multiple parties—lead arrangers, participants, and 
borrowers.  More evidence is necessary to complete the picture.  
This study contributes to the extensive literature on syndicated lending by focusing on 
lender characteristics as a driver of syndicate structure rather than borrower characteristics, which 
have been the primary focus of this stream of research. I also contribute to the literature 
investigating the consequences of bank mergers by documenting that merged lead banks form 
relationships with unfamiliar syndicate participants and increase their commitment to new loans 




 Table 1 - Sample Selection  
Table 1 presents the sample selection process and is discussed in section 3.1. The sample period spans from 1989 to 2012. Loan 
data is from DealScan, and merger information comes from the SNL Financial Bank Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
 
Filters Number of Facilities 
Syndicated loans to public U.S. borrowers by U.S. banks,  
in U.S. dollars, issued from 1989 to 2012 26,033 
After excluding:   
     Financial firms 22,641 
     Loans with insufficient loan data 13,911 
     Loans with insufficient borrower and lender data 9,752 
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 Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the key variables in my sample of loans originated between 1989 and 2012. Each observation 
represents a facility-lead pair, except the observations for Participant-Lead No-Relationship, which represent facility-lead-
participant pairs. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
  
N Mean S.D. Median Q1 Q3 
Merger Variable 
      
Merger 9,752 0.275 0.447 0 0 1        
Outcome Variables 
      
Participant-Lead No-Relationship 102,905 0.214 0.41 0 0 0 
Lead Allocation 4,546 21.10 16.44 15 9.222 27.50 
Syndicate Concentration (Herfindhal Index) 4,166 1,686 1,415 1,139 675.7 2,180        
Loan Characteristics 
      
Covenant 9,752 1.735 1.295 2 1 3 
PP 9,752 0.671 0.470 1 0 1 
Amount 9,752 5.399 1.341 5.52 4.60 6.30 
Maturity 9,752 3.772 0.615 4.094 3.584 4.094 
Spread 9,752 4.903 0.787 5.091 4.443 5.521 
Revolver 9,752 0.633 0.482 1 0 1 
Term Loan B 9,752 0.0842 0.278 0 0 0 
Collateral 9,752 0.610 0.488 1 0 1 
Borrower-Lead Relationship 9,752 0.505 0.500 1 0 1        
Borrower Characteristics 
      
ROA 9,752 0.009 0.024 0.011 0.003 0.02 
Interest Coverage 9,752 14.03 46.92 3.927 1.647 9.230 
Leverage 9,752 0.628 0.219 0.616 0.493 0.737 
Size 9,752 7.331 1.601 7.277 6.134 8.439 
MTB 9,752 2.494 3.923 1.912 1.195 3.125 
Rated 9,752 0.624 0.485 1 0 1        
Lender Characteristics 
      
Lender Size 9,752 12.93 1.241 13.11 12.05 14.03 
Lender Deposit 9,752 0.548 0.117 0.559 0.459 0.643 
Lender Loan 9,752 0.327 0.232 0.366 0 0.506 
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Table 3 - Bank Mergers and Participation Decision 
Table 3 presents the analysis of the effect of bank mergers on syndicate participation decision by participating lenders. The variable 
of interest is in bold. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. T-
statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by loan package level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
  Participant-Lead No-Relationship 
Merger 0.025*** 









Term Loan B 0.174*** 
 (10.561) 












Investment Rating -0.020** 
 (-2.107) 
Borrower-Lead Relationship -0.047*** 
 (-7.424) 
First Lead 0.466*** 
 (5.038) 
Lender Size -0.029 
 (-1.614) 
Lender Deposit -0.150 
 (-1.612) 




Lender/Year FE YES 
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Table 4 - Bank Mergers and Syndicate Structure 
Table 4 presents the analyses of the effect of bank mergers on syndicate structure measured by lead allocation and syndicate 
concentration (Herfindhal index). The variable of interest is in bold. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. T-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by loan package 
level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 Lead Allocation   Syndicate Concentration 
  (1)   (2) 
Merger 1.327**   79.06* 
  (2.279)   (1.670) 
Amount -4.352***  -434.2*** 
 (-14.12)  (-15.26) 
Maturity -2.360***  -240.2*** 
 (-5.912)  (-6.729) 
Spread -0.505  -68.78* 
 (-1.192)  (-1.913) 
PP -2.519***  -167.5*** 
 (-3.454)  (-2.625) 
Collateral -0.471  -5.247 
 (-0.843)  (-0.108) 
Covenant -1.014***  -101.6*** 
 (-3.741)  (-4.362) 
Revolver 2.104***  166.5*** 
 (4.665)  (4.113) 
Term Loan B 13.92***  849.8*** 
 (5.687)  (3.219) 
ROA -35.48***  -3,386*** 
 (-2.948)  (-3.282) 
Interest Coverage 0.00368  0.153 
 (0.741)  (0.334) 
Leverage -5.340***  -516.4*** 
 (-3.566)  (-4.402) 
Size -3.326***  -279.0*** 
 (-11.57)  (-10.71) 
MTB -0.146**  -10.76** 
 (-2.379)  (-1.985) 
Investment Rating -1.018  -57.79 
 (-1.609)  (-1.066) 
Borrower-Lead Relationship -0.709  -119.4*** 
 (-1.643)  (-3.230) 
First Lead 6.192**  216.8 
 (2.374)  (1.025) 
Lender Size -1.018  -164.3* 
 (-0.838)  (-1.708) 
Lender Deposit 12.01**  403.7 
 (2.191)  (0.895) 
Lender Loan -8.720***  -655.4*** 
 (-3.050)  (-2.643) 
Observations 4,535  4,156 
R-squared 0.549  0.586 
Lender/Year FE YES   YES 
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Table 5 - Participant-Borrower Relationship 
Table 5 presents results on whether the effect of bank mergers on syndicate structure is attenuated by a prior relationship between 
a participant lender and the borrower. Participant-Borrower Relationship is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the ratio of the 
number of participants who have been involved in a deal with the borrower over the five-year period preceding the loan issue date 
to the total number of participants in a deal is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. The variable of interest is in bold.  Variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. T-statistics in parentheses are 
based on standard errors clustered by loan package level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
 
 Lead Allocation   Syndicate Concentration 













Merger * Participant-Borrower Relationship -2.343**   -173.9** 

























































































































Lender/Year FE YES   YES 
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Table 6 - Transparency of the Borrower’s Information Environment 
Table 6 investigates whether the effect of bank mergers on syndicate structure varies by borrower transparency. Panels A, B, and 
C report results of the analyses in which borrower transparency is measured based on a borrower’s analyst coverage intensity 
(Analyst Coverage), a borrower’s credit rating (Rated), and a borrower’s size (Small Borrower). Analyst Coverage equals 1 if the 
number of equity analysts following the borrower is above the sample median in the year of a loan’s issuance and 0 otherwise. 
Rated equals 1 if the borrower has an investment-grade credit rating in the year of a loan’s issuance and 0 otherwise. Small Borrower 
equals 1 if the borrower’s total assets are below the sample median in the year of a loan’s issuance and 0 otherwise. The variables 
of interest are in bold. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
T-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by loan package level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Analyst Coverage 
 Lead Allocation   Syndicate Concentration 
  (1)   (2) 
Merger 2.790***  216.9*** 
 (3.320)  (3.012) 
Analyst Coverage 0.226  11.5 
 (0.404)  -0.242 
Merger * Analyst Coverage -2.955***   -277.4*** 
  (-2.987)   (-3.513) 
Controls YES  YES 
Observations 4,535  4,156 
R-squared 0.551  0.588 
Lender/Year FE YES   YES 
 
Panel B: Borrower Credit Rating 
 Lead Allocation   Syndicate Concentration 
  (1)   (2) 
Merger 2.415***  201.6*** 
 (2.860)  (2.776) 
Rated -0.417  10.58 
 (-0.618)  (0.182) 
Merger * Rated -2.037**   -235.2*** 
  (-2.004)   (-2.826) 
Controls YES  YES 
Observations 4,535  4,156 
R-squared 0.551  0.588 




Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Borrower Size    
 Lead Allocation   Syndicate Concentration 
  (1)   (2) 
Merger 2.243**   -10.34 
  (2.219)   (-0.203) 
Small Borrower -0.0422  -20.99 
 (-0.0536)  (-0.323) 
Merger * Small Borrower 2.243**   167.0** 
  (2.219)   (2.084) 
Controls YES  YES 
Observations 4,535  4,156 
R-squared 0.550  0.587 




Table 7 – Lead Reputation 
Table 7 presents results on whether the effect of bank mergers on syndicate structure is attenuated by a lead bank’s reputation. 
Large Lead equals 1 if the lead arranger is in the top quartile of market share during the year and 0 otherwise. The variable of 
interest is in bold. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. T-
statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by loan package level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 














Merger * Large Lead -2.085*   -194.2** 






























































































































Appendix A – Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Merger An indicator variable equal to 1 if the lead bank was involved in a 
merger over the one-year period preceding the loan issuance date, 0 
otherwise. 
Lead Allocation The percentage of the loan financed by the lead arranger. 
Syndicate Concentration (Herfindhal 
Index) 
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of loan holdings among syndicate 
members. It is the sum of the squared individual shares in the loan and 
varies from 0 to 10,000, with 10,000 being the Herfindahl when a 
lender holds 100% of the loan.  
Participant-Lead No-Relationship An indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant has not been involved 
in a deal with the lead arranger over the one-year period preceding the 
loan issuance date, 0 otherwise. 
ROA The ratio of the borrower’s income before extraordinary items to its 
total assets, estimated in the quarter preceding a loan’s issuance. 
Interest Coverage The ratio of earnings before interest and tax to the interest expense, 
estimated in the quarter preceding a loan’s issuance. 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities to the book value of assets, estimated in the 
quarter preceding a loan’s issuance. 
Size The natural logarithm of the book value of assets, estimated in the 
quarter preceding a loan’s issuance. 
MTB The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity, 
estimated in the quarter preceding a loan’s issuance. 
Investment Rating An indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower has an investment-
grade senior debt rating from S&P, 0 otherwise. 
Amount The natural logarithm of the facility amount in U.S. dollars. 
Maturity The natural logarithm of the number of months to maturity. 
Spread The natural logarithm of the all-in-drawn spread over LIBOR. 
PP An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan has a performance pricing 
provision, 0 otherwise. 
Collateral An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is secured, 0 otherwise. 
Covenants The number of financial covenants. 
Revolver An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is a revolving line of credit, 
0 otherwise. 
Term Loan B An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan type is a term loan B or 
below (C, D, E and F), 0 otherwise. 
Borrower-Lead Relationship An indicator variable equal to 1 if a loan’s lead arranger has syndicated 
a loan to the borrower over the five-year period preceding the loan 
issuance date, 0 otherwise. 
# of Lenders The number of participating lenders in a syndicate. 
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Lender Size The natural logarithm of the bank holding company’s (BHC’s) book 
value of total assets, estimated in the quarter preceding a loan’s 
issuance. 
Lender Deposits The ratio of the BHC’s total deposits to its total book assets, estimated 
in the quarter preceding a loan’s issuance. 
Lender Loans The ratio of the BHC’s total loans (net of unearned income) to its total 
book assets, estimated in the quarter preceding a loan’s issuance. 
First Time Lead An indicator variable equal to 1 if the lender serves as the lead arranger 
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